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Foreword
This paper is part of a series which will cover each of the main areas of Phare activity. It describes
the nature of the problems faced in Phare's partner countries during their transition from planned to
market economies. It goes on to examine actions undertaken to date, and to assess their impact on
the transformation process.
There is clearly a need to ensure that the approach being taken in any given sector is relevant to the
longer-term goals of economic transformation. For this reason, these papers also contain the
thinking of those responsible for operating Phare on actions for the future and how Phare should
contribute to the next phase of the ffansition.
The papers do not reflect any official position of the European Commission. They have been
written by the Phare Operational Units and are intended as a stimulus to discussion for all those
involved in the debate on economic transformation in central and eastern Europe.
Alan Mayhew
Relations with central and east European countries
The Phare Programme
The Phare Programme is a European Union initiative
which supports the development of a larger democratic
family of nations within a prosperous and stable Europe.
Its aim is to help the countries of central and eastern
Europe rejoin the mainstream of European development
and build closer political and economic ties with the
European Union.
Phare does this by providing grant finance to support the
process of economic transformation and to strengthen
newly created democratic societies. Phare also provides
grant finance to help countries with Europe Agreements
integrate with the European Union.
In its first five years of operation to 1994, Phare has
made available ECU 4,283 million to 11 partner
countries, making Phare the largest assistance
progmmme of its kind.
Phare works in close cooperation with its partner
countries to decide how funds are to be spent, within a
framework agreed with the European Union. This
ensures that Phare funding is relevant to each
government's own reform policies and priorities. Each
country takes the responsibility for running its own
programmes.
Phare provides know-how from a wide range of non-
commercial, public and private organisations to its
partner countries. It acts as a multiplier by stimulating
investrnent and responding to needs that cannot be met
by others. Phare acts as a powerful catalyst by unlocking
funds for important projects from other donors through
studies, capital grants, guarantee schemes and credit
lines. It also invests directly in infrastructure, which will
account for more Phare funds as the restructuring
process progresses.
The main priorities for Phare funding are common to all
countries, although everyone is at a different stage of
transformation. The key areas include resffucturing of
state enterprises including agriculture, private sector
development, reform of institutions and public
administration, reform of social services, employment,
education and health, development of energy, tansport
and telecommunications infrastructure, and environment
and nuclear safety. Under the Europe Agreements, Phare
funding is being used to make laws compatible with
European Union norms and standards, and to align
practices.
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Executive sufirmary
This paper presents an overview ofthe food aid provided
to the central and eastern European countries by the
European Union since the beginning of their economic
ffansition in 1989.
One immediate side-effect of the far-reaching economic
refonn process was disruption of the previous economic
system, leading to a number of problems including
reduced agricultural production and food shortages.
Trade with ex-Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
partners collapsed, and internal production and
distibution systems, based on state-owned monopolistic
structures, dissolved before they could be replaced by a
functioning market system based on independent
operators responding to market signals. In addition,
foreign exchange resources were scarce, and most
central and eastern European countries were facing
deficits in their balance of payments and huge foreign
debts.
In a number of countries, food shortages appeared. To
ensure that the shortages did not undermine the
democratisation process and economic restructuring,
food aid, in the form of agricultural products, was the
first instrument introduced by the European Union to
support the central and eastern European countries as
their tansition got underway.
This paper summarises the policy and strategies applied
by the European Commission, which is responsible for
administering the European Union's food aid to the
central and eastern European countries. The processes
of evaluating food aid needs and then of financing and
implementing an operation are reviewed, as is the use of
the Counterpart Funds generated by the sale of the
products provided as food aid on the local markets.
Details of the food aid operations conducted in
individual countries, in terms of budgetary allocations
and specific products delivered, are provided in the
annex. The impact and achievement of the operations
that have been conducted to date are then assessed. The
paper concludes with policy orientation for food aid
operations in the future. The main conclusions are:
o resources from the Phare programme should be used
principally to fund triangular operations (where food
products are supplied by one central and eastern
European country and imported by another). Where
balance of payments support is envisaged to support
food imports, European Agricultural Guidance and
Guarantee Fund intervention stocks could be made
available, given that their budget value is below the
world market price
. conditionality, in tenns of economic refonn, has not
been applied by the European Union to its food aid
operations, unlike some other donors. Serious
consideration will be given to the possibility of
introducing such conditionality given the potential
significance of Counterpart Funds. Certain
requirements for their constitution, to be met by the
partner government, should be made a precondition
for the provision of food aid by the European Union.
A plan for their use needs to be prepared, taking into
account the benefits accruing from using them in the
shortest possible time. Accumulated funds need to be
placed in an interest-bearing account, offering
competitive market interest rates
. most, if not all donors use the international market
prices of the products provided in order to calculate
the cost of their food aid operations. The Commission
has always valued the European Union's operations by
using European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee
Fund budget prices, which are up to 50 per cent lower
than the world market prices. This method of
valuation has led to underestimation of the European
Union's real contribution to the intemational food aid
effort. Phare is therefore considering the possibility of
using international prices as a reference in the
presentation of food aid operations costs in future.

Section 1 - General characteristics
Background
Between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the
1990s, the central and eastern European countries
embarked on a far-reaching transformation of their
economies from the centrally planned to the free market
model. An immediate consequence of this
transformation was disruption of the previous economic
system, leading to a number of problems including
reduced agricultural production and food shortages.
The economies of the central and eastern European
countries were heavily biased towards intra-COMECON
trade. When COMECON collapsed, it was impossible
to immediately substitute a new and, equivalent set of
external trade relations. In a{dition, foreign exchange
resources were scarce, and niost central and eastern
European countries were facing deficits in their balance
of payments and huge foreign debts. The internal
production and distribution systems, based on state-
owned monopolistic structures, dissolved before they
could be replaced by a functioning market system based
on independent operators responding to market signals.
In a number of countries, food shortages were therefore
one of the immediate side-effects of the economic
revolution. To ensure that the shortages did not
undermine the democratisation process and economic
restructuring, food aid, in the form of agricultural
products, was therefore the first instrument introduced
by the European Union to support the central and eastern
European countries as their transition got underway.
Definition of food aid to the central
and eastern European countries
Under the European Union's prograrnme of food aid to
the cental and eastern European countries, agricultural
products are supplied to those countries experiencing a
food deficit and then sold inside the country at market
prices through the existing marketing system. The
agricultural products provided have been primarily for
human consumption, but in some cases also for animal
nutrition. Such food aid should be viewed as an
instrument providing a form of balance-of-payments
supportl, since it has helped overcome problems linked
to the scarcity of foreign exchange resources.
Soon after the start-up of the food aid operations, the
Phare programme for economic assistance was launched.
Phare's initial actions were often intended to phase out
food aid as soon as possible, through delivery of
agricultural inputs or other means of boosting local
agricultural production.
I Phare has where necessary also funded humanitarian aid to some central and eastern European countries, such as Albania and Romania. This has
taken the form of certain specific food products such as baby food, along with medicines and other emergency items. This document is not
concerned with this food aid, which has an explicit humanitarian character. It focuses only on the form of food aid known in international
organisations as 'programme food aid', i.e. aid composed of basic food @ucts which, in all cases, are sold on the local markets as opposed to
being distributed to target groups.
l0 Generalcharacteristics
Objectives
The short and medium-term objective of the European
Union's food aid to the central and eastern European
countries has been to help them overcome food
shortages, re-establish local production and self-
sufficiency and at the same time alleviate the immediate
hardships which the tansformation process causes to the
population. Care must be taken to ensure that, in
meeting these objectives, markets are not overloaded
with cheap imports, thereby discouraging local
production, depressing domestic prices or preventing the
emergence of private commercial operators. Food aid
has to be progressively phased out as local production
increases, until self-sufficiency is achieved.
The longer-term objective of food aid is to establish a
new distribution network and to boost domestic trade in
basic food commodities.
Principles
Certain fundamental principles have been incorporated
into the European Union's food aid policy towards the
cenfral and eastern European countries:
Integrated approach
Account has to be taken, when providing food aid, ofthe
other forrns of assistance being provided to the parher
country. An overall transfer of know-how strategy is
devised, incorporating the food aid, which therefore
forms part of an integrated package of assistance. In
particular, it is closely related to the know-how provided
through the Phare programme in agriculture, the
humanitarian actions undertaken in certain cases and the
balance of payments assistance extended to some end-
users.
Relevance to the particular needs and situation
Food aid responds to food deficit situations resulting
from the initial disruption caused by the process of
economic transformation or, in case of structural food
deficits, is provided to countries facing balance of
payments problems resulting from the economic
transition. Food deficit often results from economic
adjustment problems in the agricultural sector during the
transition to a market economy. It has a temporary
character and in most cases lasts for two to three
agriculture campaigns. Food aid has been provided
during the adjustment phase and has been progressively
phased out as the overall economic situation has
improved, as agricultural production has increased and
as self-sufficiency has been re-established (see ovedeaf).
Principles 1l
Example: Albania
The Albanian case is probably the most illustrative
example of the 'phase-in-phase-out' approach, which
responds to changing circumstances in the partner
country. The country's cereal production went down
from 650,000 tonnes (before the reform) to 225,000
tonnes (in 1991 the year of the economic collapse).
This prompted the G 24, whose aid the European
Commission is responsible for coordinating, to
approve a food aid operation totalling some 450,(XX)
tonnes. Two years on, local production had increased
to 425,000 tonnes. The amount of food aid required
had declined accordingly, and only some 250,000
tonnes were made available by the international
donors lm1993.
Inter-agency coordination
It is essential that food aid operations be planned and
implemented in close collaboration and consultation
with other concerned donor agencies and G 24, whose
aid to the central and eastern European countries is
coordinated by the European Commission. Only in this
way can a coherent approach be ensured, and in
particular the risk of delivering excessive quantities
(thereby depressing local agricultural production or
provoking market displacement) be avoided.
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Section 2 - Review of food aid operations to the
central and eastern European countries
Overview of main food aid
operations
As explained above, food aid has only been provided to
certain of the central and eastern European countries,
where there have been serious food shortages at some
stage in the economic tansition. Equally, the duration
of food aid actions, and the size of budgetary allocations,
have been specific to each case. Overall, however, in
the period 1989-1993 a total of ECU 516.6 million has
been allocated for food aid to a number of cenftal and
eastern European countries, with nearly 4.2 millon
tonnes of staples delivered. The table below shows the
value of food aid delivered each year to each of the
cental and eastern European countries concerned:
Further details of the programmes undertaken on behalf
of individual central and eastern European countries are
given in the Annex .
Value of food aid delivered each year (MECU)
1989
Operational issues
Evaluation offood aid needs
After a request for assistance is presented by a country,
the starting-point for any decision to provide food aid is
an evaluation of its food aid needs through a thorough
assessment of the overall demand and supply situation
for food products.
A number of different factors are evaluated by the
European Commission (general economic parameters;
the balance of payments situation; the availability of
foreign exchange or access to international credit
markets; the ability of internal marketing, distribution
and pricing systems to fulfil the roles required of them;
and logistical aspects such as capacrty of ports, internal
transportation and storage). The main emphasis is put
on comparing national consumption to national
agricultural production, calculated on the basis of
cultivated areas, yields and crops planted, livestock
production, processing potential and losses. On this
basis, an expected food balance-sheet is prepared, with
European Union food aid meeting the shorffall between
consumption and internal availability (production and
stocks, adjusted for estimated losses, exports,
commercial imports, food aid from other sources). The
balance-sheet covers all basic food products (wheat,
meat, dairy products, vegetable oil, sugar, etc.).
On the basis of the long and short-term objectives
described above, and also the overall aid'stategy of the
G 24 towards the central and eastern European countries
in question, this evaluation allows a decision to be taken
on a particular food aid operation and the type and
quantities of food products 0o be supplied as well as the
most suitable means of distibuting them.
19m t99t 1W2 1W3
Albania 85M
Bulgaria n
Estonia llt1
Latvia t215
Lithuania 2t20
Romania
123
48 49 t4
Poland 27
r0
Operationalissues l3
The European Commission does not follow the
International Monetary Fund recommended method of
calculating the overall food aid needs purely on the basis
of national budget deficits. This method entails a
calculation of the sum needed to balance the state
budget, and hanslation of this figure into quantities of
food aid supplies. Inherent in this approach is the risk of
delivering more food aid than is actually needed to
compensate for the food shortage. If this takes place,
internal prices may be depressed, with local production
discouraged as a result, and negative effects on the
emerging private commercial sector. Instead, the
European Commission has opted for an approach which
partially compensates the budget deficit through
provision offood aid.
Budgetary considerations
The European Union does not have any specific
budgetary instrument at its disposal to provide food aid
to the cenfral and eastern European countries, since food
aid is provided under exceptional circumstances only
and is considered a temporary measure. Two budget
instruments have been used to respond to food aid
requests from cenffal and eastern European countries:
. the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee
Fund has been the main source of funding to pay for the
goods and their tansportation, although this constitutes
an exceptional use of this budget-line. Where the
EAGGF is used, goods are supplied out of stocks built
up through intervention on the markets of the European
Union Member States in pursuit of the European
Union's Common Agricultural Policy. The value of the
goods supplied is expressed in standard budget value
which is different from international market prices. The
cost of transportation is determined through auction
. Phare has also been used to pay for goods acquired on
the open market in the European Union or in other
central and eastern European countries, and for their
transportation to the country where food aid is
required. Where the supplier of the goods is another
central and eastern European country, the process is
known as a 'triangular operation'. In such cases, it is
estimated which central and eastern European
countries have a surplus in the agricultural product
required and could therefore be pot€ntial exporters. A
number of potential exporters are taken into
consideration, and the supplier is selected following a
tendering procedure. The value of the goods
corresponds to international market prices.
Traditional trade links or established business contacts
are other important factors taken into consideration.
Implementation
After defining the objectives of an operation, the
quantities and type of commodities to be delivered are
agreed by all parties, and a Memorandum of
Understanding is signed with the governments of the
partner countries. This document governs the
implementation of food aid operations, setting out
details of transport facilities, delivery points, period of
arrival, distribution and marketing procedures (system of
sales, pricing), generation of Counterpart Funds, their
management and use, and monitoring and evaluation
procedures. Where a country has already signed a
general agreement with the Commission on Counterpart
Funds, the memorandum on food aid refers to it and, if
necessary, incorporates amendments into the overall
agreement.
ln most cases transfer of the necessary know-how for
implementation of the food aid operations also has to be
provided to the recipient country. This assists
governments in the planning of the arrivals, preparation
of distribution plans, securing the warehousing and
internal transport, establishing monitoring systems,
setting up of Counterpart Funds, and the preparation of
disbursement schemes from the Coun0erpart Funds.
Donor coordination
Proper coordination among the G 24 is essential if the
short and long-term objectives of a food aid operation
are to be achieved. Collaboration with other donor
agencies and/or donor countries is therefore initiated
early in the preparation of operations and a common
approach is defined. Assessment of food aid needs isjointly conducted by the major donors and agreement is
reached on the responsibilities of the different parties
regarding the types and quantities of food aid to be
supplied, as well as delivery periods. There is also
coordination regarding the collection, management and
use of Counterpart Funds.
In all cases, the goods delivered as food aid have been
supplied to the border of the parher country and handed
over to organisations entrusted by its government to be
in charge of internal distribution and sales.
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The policy in terms of resale price has generally been to
reflect the international market price of the goods
supplied. In certain situations, where international
prices have proved prohibitively high for local
consumers, thus jeopardising the objective of alleviating
hardship, the goods are sold at prevailing market prices,
but in any case high enough in order to avoid the
disincentive effects of cheaper imports on local
production.
The system of internal sales has progressively developed
from a fixed-price system towards a system of market
prices. Early on during food aid operations, the use of
fixed prices often proved the only way of ensuring quick
distribution and sales: a functioning market for these
products had not yet emerged and/or prices of a number
of agricultural products were still controlled by the
government. As the reform process progresses, it
becomes possible to introduce an auction system of
internal sales, where prices are set according to supply
and demand. This development from fixed prices to
marketing through auction has been observed in a
number of the cenfial and eastern European countries to
which food aid has been provided: e.g. Bulgaria,
Albania, Poland.
In some of the countries, a degree of outside support has
been required at an early stage of operations to ensure
effective distribution. This is because existing
distribution networks were disrupted, with no new
private disfibutors having yet emerged to fill this role.
Support may be required in the form of transport, sales
practices or control on prices set by merchants. This type
of assistance has been provided to Albania through the
Pellicano (Italian, but partly financed by EAGGF) and
Pyros (Greek) operations.
Counterpart Funds
The benefits of food aid are not only limited to the
physical provision of food. The local currency
generated by the sale of food can then be put to other
uses within the country concerned. These Counterpart
Funds can sometimes have effects as significant as the
use of the food itself, when set against the long-term
objective of economic development. For this potential
to be realised, however, it is essential to reach agreement
with the government of the partner country on
accumulation of the funds in an interest-bearing account
at market interest rates. Procedures for disbursement,
audit and control must also be clearly defined. The
transfer of additional know-how may be required to
ensure that the expertise to collect and monitor the
Counterpart Funds is built up locally.
As one of the short-term objectives of food aid to the
central and eastern European countries has been to
alleviate the hardship resulting from the early stages of
transformation, the Counterpart Funds generated have
been used mainly for social purposes (e.g. for topping up
pensions and family allowances, distribution of free
meals). Another part has been used to cover local
distribution expenses (internal transport, storage and
handling cost). In Albania, Counterpafi Funds were
used successfully to support the state budget. Proceeds
from food aid made up about 75 pr cent of govemment
budget receipts in 1992, and about 45 per cent in 1993.
Section 3 - Assessment
Impact of European Union food aid
on the recipient central and eastern
European countries
Economic effects
At the rnacro-economic level, the most important effect
of food aid is its positive impact on the balance of
payments. The food aid supplied has saved the cenhal
and eastern European countries concerned from making
substantial expenditure on food imports, thereby
depleting the already scarce foreign exchange resources
available. On the internal markets of the central and
eastern European countries concerned, food aid has
helped stabilise prices, in addition to securing
availability.
As regards agricultural pro{uction, it was suggested by
some that food aid would have a negative effect because
it would depress prices, thereby reducing incentives to
production. In practice, no serious negative
consequences have been observed. This is because food
aid has been used only as a temporary measure with a
transitional character. Moreover, quantities provided
have actually been quite small compared with overall
consumption. With the exception of Albania, the
volumes supplied represented on average less than ten
per cent of import requirements and a very small part of
local production (two per cent on average). Such low
levels of aid delivered over such short periods cannot be
said to have major negative effects on local production
and this is borne out by follow-up evaluation.
Example: Poland - food aid did not force down
agricultural production.
It is clear that the food aid progr:unme did not force
down cereal production in Poland, which actually
increased, year-by-year from 1988-1989 to 1991-
1992.ln L9N-199t, Poland became self-sufficient in
cereals and a net exporter n L99L-1992. This should
be confrasted with the situation in the 1980s, when
Poland was a traditional importer of cereals.
A significant positive impact can also be observed on the
food processing industries in some cases. As the supply
of raw materials from local production to the industy
was very low, the food aid deliveries kept the factories
working, increasing their turnover and having a positive
effect on employment. OnIy European Union food aid
kept the milling industry in Albania working; during the
food aid operations to Romania, European Union aid
represented 30 per cent to 50 per cent of output. In
Albania, where food aid has been provided both in
substantial quantities and in a wide variety of different
products, it has boosted the rapid development of new
forms of internal trade. The private tansport sector has
also benefited.
Soci"l effects
Designed to alleviate food shortages, the European
Union's food aid has been an additional source of food
to the population, especially in critical moments when its
availability was low. At the same time, the use of
Counterpart Funds to fund social support programmes
has further benefited consumers. Food habits have not
been significantly affected, since the products supplied
originated from Europe and have broadly corresponded
to the usual consumption patterns in the partner
countries. Where there have been some differences
between the types of food provided as food aid and
taditional patterns of consumption, it is most unlikely
that habits will have been materially altered, given the
short duration of the operations.
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Operational aspects
Cost-effectiveness considerations
When humanitarian considerations are not the principal
motivation behind the decision to $ant food aid, and the
prime objective is to solve economic problems, it
becomes particularly important to take account of cost-
effectiveness and/or comparative advantage when
designing the operation.
The overall cost of a food aid operation is basically
determined by two components: the cost of the food
products themselves, and the cost of their fiansportation.
Because products from European Agricultural Guidance
and Guarantee Fund stocks cost less than the
international price, twice the volume can be purchased
for the same expenditure. At the same time, a reduction
in the volume of EAGGF stocks reduces storage costs in
the European Union. When food products are purchased
at higher market prices, even if they are purchased
nearer to the country requiring food aid and are therefore
cheaper to transport, the saving on transportation is
generally not high enough to offset the extra expenditure
on the food products themselves.
When Phare resources are used, the food is purchased at
the international market price, making many food
products mote expensive. Often the only way such
operations may be considered cost-effective and may
display comparative advantage is to add some other
objective to that of economic support (for example, a
stronger humanitarian component, or reduction of stocks
in another central and eastern European country through
a triangular operation. The triangular operations
undertaken to date can be seen as positive in themselves
because they may contribute to a renewal of traditional
trade links which have been disrupted by the
transformations in the region.)
Budgetary instruments
The lack of special budgetary instruments for food aid
and the use for food aid of instruments not designed
specifically for this purpose have complicated the
implementation of food aid operations.
The EAGGF budget is very large but is designed to be
an instrument of the European Union's Common
Agricultural Policy, not as a mechanism for delivering
food aid. Only certain products are kept in intervention
stocks (cereals, beef, rice, olive oil, butter, milk powder)
and, clearly, any other products which were required
(e.g. sunflower oil, baby food, pig meat) have to be
purchased on the open market. Consequently, the
EAGGF, as an instrument for food aid, does not possess
the flexibility to respond to various situations (e.g.
triangular operations or delivery of items which do not
originate from intervention measures.)
The Phare budget has the advantage of greater
flexibility, but it is meant to cover every aspect of
economic transition in the central and eastern European
countries. Any use of its resources for purchasing food
aid automatically reduces the funds available for other
operations which are more cental to medium and long-
term economic restructuring. Phare has primarily been
used in niangular operations (such as the one conducted
in 1992 in favour of Romania with 89,000 tonnes of
wheat from the former Czechoslovakia).
Evaluation offood aid needs
The European Commission has in some cases been
criticised for not having made a thorough and correct
assessment of the food aid needs. Urgent action is
usually required when requests for food aid are made in
response to deficits. The Commission has, as a result of
the strict time pressures involved, sometimes taken
decisions which, with hindsight, were not the most
appropriate in terms of products and quantities needed.
The situation is different with structural food deficits,
which are, by definition, expected. Evaluation of
Albania's food aid needs has been a regular exercise,
with the information required to define an operation
provided well in advance.
It should be emphasised, however, that in the early years
accurate assessment was often hindered by unreliable
agricultural statistics and other data which did not reflect
the reality of the situation in the country concerned, and
by difficulties in interpretation of definitions. In any
case, these errors have not had any major influence on
the final outcome of operations, nor have they led to
negative effects on local production. In some cases, and
particularly at the end of a series of operations in a given
country, initial signs of market displacement have been
observed. Significant stocks of food aid have made it
more difficult to re-establish traditional international
trade links where this might otherwise have occurred
under local economic conditions.
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Example: Problems encountered in re-establishing
traditional trade links
As the end of the food aid operations in Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania illustrated, the availability of
large food aid stocks slowed down commercial
imports from neighbours in the former Soviet Union,
which might otherwise have developed. Another
example can be found with Albania: the unexpected
appearance of private flour importers during the last
quarter of 1993 meant that the total available stocks
of grain and especially wheat flour (food aid, private
imports, and local production) were too high
compared with demand, affecting the pricing
structure. Fortunately, this took place only at the end
of the food aid operations and only for a limited
duration. Production was therefore not negatively
affected, as it would probably have been if the
problem had occurred earlier during the operation (it
is difficult to stop at short notice an operation which
is already underway).
Donor coordination
In theory, if donors do not synchronise deliveries of food
aid, a number of problems can emerge:
. for the partner country concentration of arrivals in the
same period may reduce internal prices, whereas lack
of supplies over a prolonged period may raise prices
dramatically, and even cause social disturbance. In
either case, the very objective of the operation (in
terms of price stabilisation and fostering of internal
trade) may be jeopardised
. for the donors concentration of arrivals in the same
period can also increase operational costs for the
donors themselves, either by overloading internal
transport and distribution systems or by causing
delays in vessels' discharging, so that demurrage
penalties are incurred.
In practice, most of the implemented operations have
been properly coordinated with other food aid donors
and, when appropriate, with commercial importers. On
some occasions, however, port congestion has been
recorded, as well as congestion in distribution networks.
For example, the last operation in favour of Romania
was implemented concurrently with commercial imports
of substantial quantities of cereals, resulting in serious
port congestion. Before appropriate measures for
speeding up discharging of European Union vessels
could be taken, delays in unloading the frst two vessels
had already resulted in significant demurrage penalties.
A similar situation developed in Durres, the entry port
for Albania, during November-December 1993. The
congestion was due to a combination of insufficient
donor coordination and increased commercial imports.
Penalties were incurred, and internal logistics problems
(in terms of warehousing and transport) were also
encountered.
Counterpart Funds: the potentially significant impact
of Counterpart Funds imposes an imperative to define,
wherever possible, at the initial stage of preparation of
operations, clear aims for the use of the Counterpart
Funds. Given the urgency of getting some operations
underway (because of the humanitarian dimension) such
objectives were not always adequately defined for all
food aid operations carried out to date, especially in the
early years.
Experience has, however, taught useful lessons on how
the impact of Counterpart Funds can be maximised.
Their use for development purposes (for example, to
cover local expenses of Phare projects) has proved
difficult to achieve, because it requires coherence
between the rate at which the funds are constituted and
the rate at which they need to be disbursed to support the
project. This has not been found to exist very often in
practice. In general terrns, Counterpart Funds have been
most effective where they are used for simple and direct
disbursement (e.g. social welfare schemes, direct budget
support) not requiring particular coordination with other
forms of aid, long-term planning and follow-up.
Problems can also be encountered with Counterpart
Funds as a result of insufficient coordination between
different donors. In this respect, problems were
encountered in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, where
donors applied different procedures for fixing the prices
and for the constitution of the Counterpart Funds.
Different prices were charged for the same product
delivered as food aid by different donors, the internal
price eroded and as a result the Counterpart Funds
generated were smaller than expected.
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Effect offood aid to central and eastern European
countries on other food aid provided by the European
Union
The idea that food aid has been provided to the cenfral
and eastern European countries at the expense of other
traditional recipients of food aid is a myth. The
operations described in this paper have not been part of
the international Food Aid Convention, to which the
G 24 are parties. The European Union and its Member
States, like the rest of the G 24, have not offset food aid
provided to the central and eastem European countries
against obligations under the Convention. They have, on
the other hand, continued to fuffil their obligations under
the Convention as they have always done in the past.
Consequently, aid to countries traditionally benefitting
from food aid under the Convention has been maintained
and there has been no reduction in food aid provided to
the southern hemisphere as a result of increased food aid
deliveries to eastern Europe.
l9
Section 4 - Conclusion and future orientations
With the progress of reform, the overall economic
situation in the central and eastern European countries
has improved and the downward trend in agricultural
production has been reversed in most countries. Food
shortages in most cases have disappeared, so that food
aid is no longer required. Where there are food deficis,
the countries are for the time being able to meet their
requirements through commercial imports. Even if
some still face balance-of-payments problems and lack
of foreign exchange, limiting 11rcir import capacity, this
is not being translated into food shortages on the
domestic open market.
In this respect, the European Commission is still
carefully monitoring the evolution of agricultural
production, and the food supply, in a number of
countries, particularly those where the agricultural
recovery is still precarious, and where production is
therefore vulnerable to factors such as drought. There is
clearly a link here to assistance provided to the
agricultural sector in the countries concerned: one of the
purposes of such assistance being to improve food
supply through measures such as improvement of
existing distribution networks and/or of local production,
and the establishment of dishibution services.
Future orientations
The availability of Phare resources for food aid purposes
is limited because of the nature of the Phare Programme,
which is that of assistance to t}re central and eastern
European countries in the wider restructuring of their
economies. ff it proves necessary to undertake future
food aid operations with Phare resources, they should be
used as far as possible to support fiangular operations
involving two cental and eastern European countries as
supplier and importer. Such operations are a positive
step towards re-establishing traditional hade links which
have been disrupted by the transformation in central and
eastern Europe.
fffuture food aid operations need to be undertaken in the
central and eastern European countries, the European
Union should give very serious consideration to the
possibility of intoducing some fonn of conditionality in
economic reforms. This has not been the case to date,
although a number of other donors use this approach.
The question of the role food aid has to play in the
economy of the central and eastern European country
concerned will be integrated into the design. The
description of objectives should also cover aspects
related to the balance of payments, national budgets,
foreign exchange resources, etc. As a general rule,
quantifiable objectives should be included in the
operation design to allow follow-up evaluation beyond
simply recording the type and quantities of food
delivered and Counterpart Funds collected.
Maintaining effective coordination with other donors
will also be an important goal. In terms of delivery
periods, this will reduce the risk of encountering again
the problems which arose in Albania and Romania (see
Donor coordination). In terms of Counterpart Funds,
experience in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (see
Counterpart Funds) taught that donors must coordinate
marketing methods and pricing policy, as far as possible,
for each product provided in a given recipient coun0ry,
to maximise the size of the funds.
The potential significance of Counterpart Funds
generated by sales ofproducts provided as food aid also
imposes certain responsibilities on the partner
government. Certain requirements for the constitution
of Counterpart Funds, to be met by the partner
govenment, should therefore be made a precondition for
the provision of food aid by the European Union. A
plan for their use needs to be prepared, taking into
account the benefits accruing from using them in the
shortest possible time to prevent their value from being
eroded by inflation. Accumulated funds need to be
placed in an interest-bearing account, offering
competitive market interest rates.
Most, if not all, donors use the international market
prices of the products provided in order to calculate the
cost of their food aid operations. The Commission has
always valued the European Union's operations by using
EAGGF budget prices, which are up to 50 per cent lower
than the world market prices. This method of valuation
has led to underestimation of the European Union's real
contribution to the international food aid effort. For
example, if the value of the goods provided as food aid
to the central and eastern European countries is
calculated on the basis of international market prices, the
European Union's food aid amounts to about ECU 650
million, against about ECU 517 million when it is
calculated in terms of budgetary commitments. The
European Commission is therefore considering the
possibility of using international prices as a reference in
the presentation of food aid operations costs in future.
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Annex - Prograrnme suflrmary sheets
Poland
Poland was the first country to benefit from food aid, in
1989 and 1990. After price controls on most food
products were lifted and most of the food subsidies
eliminated during the summer of 1989, farmers withheld
food from the market in expectation of high price
increases, even though by the turn of the year inflation
was declining. The effect was that, by December 1989,
wheat stocks were sufficient for only a few weeks' bread
production.
During 1989 and 1990, a total of ECU 150 million from
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee
Fund and Phare budgets was therefore made available.
A breakdown of the products provided is as follows:
Bulgaria
The food deficit experienced by Bulgaria in 1991 had an
exceptional character, and was caused by the general
economic disruption which resulted from the first reform
measures. In particular, the cooperative production
system ceased to function efficiently, owing to lack of
credit and inputs. Moreover, at the beginning of the
year, the repayment of foreign debt was stopped and
Bulgaria did not have access to hard curency credits.
ECU 26.6 millon from the EAGGF budget were
therefore allocated to Bulgaria for food aid in 1991.
The funds have been used to deliver the following
products:
1,100,000 tonnes
200,000 tonnes
100,000 tonnes
5,400 tonnes
15,000 tonnes
5,000 tonnes
10,000 tonnes
The serious shortages, in particular that of cereals, were
overcome as a result of this food aid. Since then no
further food aid resources have been allocated to Poland
nor food aid delivered.
meat
butter
milk powder
After completion of that food aid operation no further
budgetary allocations for food aid have been made
available to Bulgaria.
wheat
rye
muze
olive oil
lemons
oranges
meat
11,000 tonnes
4,(X)0 tonnes
7,500 tonnes
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Romania
In the period 1990-1993, ECU 121 million were
allocated to Romania in response to a food deficit
resulting from the disintegration of the centralised state
and cooperative system of agricultural production which
caused a significant fall in agricultural output. The
general level of economic disruption, and the fall in
output, was more severe in Romania than in the other
central and eastern European countries. The decline in
agricultural production was significant and shortages
appeared in nearly all foodstuffs. The decision was
therefore taken to supply a wider range of products to
Romania than in the other cases where this form of
assistance was provided.
The following goods were supplied to the country over
the period:
malze
barley
olive oil
butter
meat
skimmed milk powder
fi,rll cream milk powder
baby food
sunflower oil
sugar
wheat
125,000 tonnes
125,000 tonnes
5,000 tonnes
10,000 tonnes
20,000 tonnes
2,000 tonnes
2,000 tonnes
1,500 tonnes
20,000 tonnes
20,000 tonnes
289,000 tonnes
(89,000 tonnes of which came from Czechoslovakia)
The last food aid operation to supply 150,000 tonnes of
milling wheat was completed in summer 1993.
The breakdown of the overall budget allocations over
the four years is as follows:
ECU 48 million (EAGGF and Phare)
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
In 1991 and 1992, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
experienced a severe deficit in cereals, both for human
consumption and animal nutrition. The deficit was a
side-effect of the separation of the three countries from
the economic system of the former Soviet Union, into
which they had previously been very tightly integrated.
On the one hand, they had been intensively specialised
in meat, at the expense of other forms of agricultural
production; on the other, they had been guaranteed the
necessary inputs for these high levels of meat production
at artificially low prices from other republics of the
Former Soviet Union. On a more general note, trade
with partners which had absorbed some 90 per cent of
exports from the three republics was severely disrupted.
In 1991 and 1992 a total amount of ECU 90 million was
therefore allocated to the three Baltic States (Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania) for food aid. Two decisions for
ECU 45 million each have been approved.
The funds originated from EAGGF and were used to
deliver cereals (wheat, rye and barley).
The breakdown of goods delivered to each country is as
follows:
First Tranche
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Second tranche
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
(ECU 45 million)
144,000 tonnes
190,000 tonnes
255,000 tonnes
(ECU45 million)
145,000 tonnes
155,000 tonnes
n4,OOO tonnes
The deliveries under the second tanche were completed
in May 1993.
r990
L99t
1992
1993
ECU 49.1 million (EAGGD
ECU 14 million (Phare)
ECU 9.9 million (Phare)
Programme summary sheets 2g
Albania
The food deficit experienced in Albania has both a
stuctural and an exceptional component, the latter being
due to inefficient production methods, combined with
the initial negative effects of the transition period on
agriculture. The legacy of the previous economic
system is that a mentality of self-sufficiency, rather than
producing to meet wider demand in the market-place,
was ingrained arnong agricultural producers. Also there
was no functioning distribution system.
The total budget allocated for food aid to Albania to date
amounts to ECU 129 million.
The budget has come from EAGGF and the breakdown
is as follows:
The following goods were supplied in the period 1991-
1993:
wheat or wheat flour or durum 830,000 tonnes
(wheat equivalent)
1991
t992
BCU M million
ECU 85 million
10,000 tonnes
6,000 tonnes
26,685 tonnes
3,651 tonnes
10,000 tonnes
2,(XX) tonnes
ECU 7 million of the budget allocation were used for
transport and internal distribution of the goods supplied
(purtid funding of the Pellicano operation).
skimmed milk powder
butter
meat
rice
sugar
olive oil

European Commission Phare Information Office Directorate General for External Economic Relations, DG I
Office Address Rue d'Arlon 88 1126 8-1040 Brussels Mailtng Addreca AN 88 1126 Rue de la Loi 2m 8-1049 Brussels
Tel (+32-2) 299 14 N I 299 13 56 I 299 16 @ Fax (+32-2) 299 17 77 PrintedJuly 1994
